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FUTURE INTERESTS-POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-FORMALITIES REQUIRED FOR RELEASE-Deceased had a general testamentary power of appointm.ent over the corpus of a trust, which provided for a gift over to his heirs
in default of appointment. Prior to his death, he executed a written document,
under seal and for consideration, whereby he released the power, and further
covenanted with the trustee who held the. property, and with the individual
takers in default, that he would not thereafter attempt to exercise the power.
He delivered the document to the trustee, for itself, and as trustee for each
individual taker in def~ult. Held, the transaction effected a valid release of the
power. District of Columbia v. Lloyd, (D. C. App. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 581.
Although much has been written abo~t releasability of the various types of
powers of appointment,1 little has been said about the formalities 'required to

1

See, for example, SUGDEN, PowERS, 8th ed., 79 (1861); KALES, FUTURE IN-

1 947}

RECENT DECISIONS

effect such release. In the absence of statute, it is generally assumed that the
donee of a releasable power can effectually relinquish such power by executing
an instrument for consideration or under seal, evidencing an intention to release
it. 2 Authorities have declared that such instrument may be delivered to any
person having an estate of freehold in the land, by way of possession, reversion
or remainder,8 or to a person whose interests would be affected by the exercise
of the power. 4 Delivery of the instrument to the trustee who holds the property
subject to the power has been held good. 5 It is almost universally held that a releasable power is extinguished by acts of the donee which are. inconsistent with a
· subsequent exercise of the power,6 such as conveying an absolute fee in the property with covenants of warranty, 7 joining with takers in default of remaindermen in a conveyance of the property, 8 or by executing a deed to the property
with a covenant to extinguish and forego the power.9 The South Carolina court
has said that no special form is required; "Any evidence therefore which satisfactorily proves the fact [ of release] is sufficient." 10 It should be noted, however, that since I 942, the law regarding the release of powers has undergone
drastic changes. As of January 1, 1947, twenty-three states had enacted statutes
on the subject,11 most of which set out procedures for accomplishing the release.
TERESTS, 2d ed., 708 (1920); l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 492 (1936); Gray,
"Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARV. L. REV. 5II (19II); 76 A.L.R. 1430
(1932).
2
SuGDEN, PoWERS, 8th ed., 82 (1861); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 336 (1)
(1940); Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S.C. 414, 12 S.E. 93 (1890); Merrill v. Lynch,
173 Misc. 39, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 514 (1939); McLaughlin v. Industrial Trust Co.,
(Del. Ch. 1945) 42 A. (2d) 12.
8
WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY, 24th ed., 474 (1926); Grosvenor v. Bowen,
15 R.I. 549, IO A. 589 (1887).
4
I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 507 (1936); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §336 (1) (1940); Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher, 133 Ky. 335, II7 S.W. 943 (1909).
15
Merrill v. Lynch, 173 Misc. 39, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 514 (1939).
8
I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 507 (1936); SUGDEN, POWERS, 8th ed., 85
(1861); Hume v. Hord, 46 Va. 374 (1849); Thorington v. Thorington, 82 Ala.
489, l S. 716 (1886).
7
Baker v.' Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 N.E. 627 (1919); Mountjoy v. Kasselman, 225 Ky. 55, 7 S.W. (2d) 512 (1928).
8
Hume v. Hord, 46 Va. 374 (1849); Thorington v. Thorington, 82 Ala. 489,
I S. 116 (1886).
9
Isaac v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 191 (1870); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288,
156 A. 84 (1931).
10
Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. C. 414 at 425, 12 S. E. 93 (1890).
11
Ala. Laws (1945) c. 67; Cal. Laws (1945) c. 318; Colo. Laws (1945) c.
146; Conn. Laws (1943) c. 422; Fla. Laws (1945) c. 23007; Ga. Laws (1945)
Act. 348; Ill. Laws (1943) vol. I, p. 6; Ind. Laws (1945) c. 258; Iowa Laws
(1943) c. 251; Ky. Laws (1944) c. 14; Md. Laws (1943) c. 870; Mass. Laws
(1943) c. 152; Mich. Laws (1945) Act 296; Miss. Laws (1946) c. 405; N. J.
Laws (1943) c. 57; N. Y. Laws (1943) c. 476; N.
Laws (1943) c. 665; Ohio
Laws (1943) §8509-22-8509-28; Pa. Laws (1943) no. 334, p. 797, amended
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All of these statutes specify that the release shall be a written instrument which
evidences an intent to release or renounce the power. Although most of the
statutes say the release may be either with or without consideration, Connecticut
and Massachusetts require it to be either for consideration or under seal, and
Colorado, Florida', Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island are silent on the subject. Missi~ippi,
Ohio, and Virginia require the release to be acknowledged in the manner of
deeds, and Maryland and Florida rec_(Uire two witnesses. New Jersey and Maryland require that the release be recorded, but most states require recordation only
to make the release effective as agairist a purchaser of the property for value.
The Virginia statute, which contains a typical recording provision, permits
recording either in the county where the property is located, where -the donee
resides, where the trustee of the property, if it is held in trust, has his residence
or principal, office, or where the instrument cr~ating the power is filed or recorded. Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin make no provision for delivery, and
Florida requires it only if the property is held in trust. Generally, recording the
release is a valid substitute for delivery. The Alabama statute, which is typical,
provides for delivery to a person specified for that purpose in the instrument
creating the power, any trustee of property subject to the power, any person who
w~uld be adversely affected by the exercise of the power, or to the proper official
for recording. Several of the statutes expi:essly provide that the specified method
of release is not exclusive, and that any other lawful means of extinguishing a
power may still be used. The question of what constitutes a valid release of a
power of appointment seems never to have been passed upon by the District of
Columbia court, but it is quite clear that the release upheld in the principal case
would have satisfied any court, so far as the formalities of execution were concerned.12
George A. Rinker, S.Ed.

(1945) no. 431, p. 1337; R. I. Laws (1944) c. 1486;,S. D. Laws (1945) c. 344;
Va. Laws (1944) c. 63; Wis. Laws (1943), chs. 513, 553. Where further reference
is made to state statutes, see those just cited. This -flurry of legislative action was
prompted by new provisions in the federal estate tax law, (56 Stat. L: 942, c. 619, 403,
as amended) which placed a premium on the releasibility of powers.
12 The court, in ruling upon the formal sufficiency of the release, said, "We deem
it enough to refer to 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 336 (1) . • . ." Principal case
at 584. On formal requirements in general, see Nossaman, "Release of Powers of
Appointment," 56 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1943).

